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A FLAW IN THE SARBANES-OXLEY
REFORM: CAN DIVERSITY IN THE
BOARDROOM QUELL CORPORATE
CORRUPTION?
STEVEN A. RAMIREZt

INTRODUCTION

Why talk about the intersection of race and corporate law?
Because that is literally where the money is. Corporations
produce ninety percent of our total gross domestic product.1 The
top 500 corporations control seventy-five percent of our nation's
most productive assets. 2 In a society that is as materialistic as
ours, to talk about any systemic racial reform without discussing
corporate governance misses this central point. 3 In short, if our
society continues to be permeated by the consequences of
yesteryear's apartheid, it is axiomatic that corporate governance

f Professor of Law and Director, Business and Transactional Law Center,
Washburn University School of Law. Courtney T. Kennedy and Brian Perkins
provided excellent research assistance for this Article. Professors Mary Ramirez,
Bill Rich, and Alex Glashausser each provided helpful insights. I wish to thank
Professor Leonard M. Baynes of St. John's University School of Law for extending
the opportunity to participate in this Symposium and write this Article.
1 JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE COMPANY: A SHORT
HISTORY OF A REVOLUTIONARY IDEA xxii, n. 11 (2003).
2 WILLIAM L. CARY
ed. 1995).

&

MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS 243-44 (7th

3 See Steven A. Ramirez, A General Theory of Cultural Diversity, 7 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 33, 40-46 (2001) [hereinafter Ramirez I] (and authorities cited therein).

Because "skin color and other racial markers have about the same significance as
shoe size," id. at 41, from a biological, scientific, and genetic perspective, all
material racially based inequalities, including representation on corporate boards,
stem from conditions of "pervasive social oppression." Id. at 46, n.76 (quoting Steven
A. Ramirez, The New Cultural Diversity and Title VII, 6 MICH. J. RACE. & L. 127,
151 (2000)). This is not to say that the lack of cultural diversity on the boards of
corporate America is due to racist decision making by those selecting board
directors. There may well be many complex factors, other than overt racism, giving
rise to the glaring racial and gender inequalities at the highest levels of corporate
America.
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plays a role. 4 This Article will address one of the most glaring
flaws plaguing corporate governance. 5 Specifically, this Article
will focus on the relative absence of diversity at the highest
levels of the American corporate governance structure.
Today, corporate America is still largely governed by white
males.
Of the 11,500 Fortune 1000 board seats, African
Americans hold 388 and Hispanics hold only 86.6 In other
words, these two groups, which together comprise about 30% of
the United States population, hold a combined 4.1% of all
Fortune 1000 board seats. 7 Women hold only 14% of the seats.8
Worse yet, 90% of all senior executives at Fortune 1000
companies are white males. 9 Whatever glacial progress was
occurring is now giving rise to signs of retrenchment; since 1999,
Hispanic board members declined by 9%.10 "More than three
decades after diversity became a buzzword in the upper tiers of
corporate America, corporate boards remain bastions of aging
white males."1 1
This Article is not premised on the patent unfairness of the
predominance of white males; instead, this Article demonstrates
4 Unfortunately, race continues to function in our society to create measurable
social chasms based upon racial identification. Thus, there is still today a vastly
different cultural experience based upon race. See Ramirez I, supra note 3, at 45-46.
"This difference in cultural experience has a wide range of consequences that may
be manifested in anything from scores on so-called intelligence tests to criminal
incarceration rates." Id. at 46.
5 There are many vexing flaws in America's system of corporate governance,
and ranking them is impossible. Some flaws are inherent in the nature of the
corporation, such as the corporation's exclusive focus on profitability and
shareholder enrichment under law. Some have argued that consequently
corporations are essentially soulless institutions. See MICKLETHWAIT, supra note 1,
at 33. As a result, corporations may engage in any profitable activity without moral
constraint. For example, chartered companies were among the pioneers of the
African slave trade. Id. at 33, 40, 177. Similarly, if corporations are given political
rights to combine with concentrated economic power, governments may be subject to
the influence of corporate special interests. Thus, President Rutherford B. Hayes
complained long ago that America had devolved into a "government of corporations,
by corporations and for corporations." Id. at xiv.
6 Gary Strauss, Good Old Boys' Network Still Rules Corporate Boards, USA
TODAY, Nov. 1, 2002, at B1.
7 See id. (stating that "[r]acial and ethnic minority groups represent 30% of the
[United States]").
8 Id.
9 Microquest White Paper: Shattering the Glass Ceiling, at http://www.mqc.com
/witepap.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2003).
10 Strauss, supra note 6, at B1.
11 Id.

HeinOnline -- 77 St. John's L. Rev. 838 2003

2003]

DIVERSITY QUELLING CORPORATE CORRUPTION

83

the fact that this culturally monolithic domination of corporate
America is bad business and bad economics.1 2 Three years ago, I
argued that the law should impose measures to facilitate
corporate America's nascent efforts to embrace diversity. 13 One
basis of my argument was that cultural diversity could enhance
small group decision-making processes and diminish the
inclination of small groups to devolve into a groupthink approach
to issues. 14 This groupthink dynamic plagues decision making
within groups that share a high degree of similar experiences
and characteristics. 15 The result is mindless adherence to group
norms and a failure to challenge implicit or underlying

12 See M. Andrew Fields & Phyllis Y. Keys, The Emergence of Corporate
Governancefrom Wall St. to Main St.: Outside Directors,Board Diversity, Earnings
Management, and ManagerialIncentives To Bear Risk, 38 FIN. REV. 1, 12-13 (2003)
(summarizing empirical evidence linking diversity to superior corporate
performance).
13 Steven A. Ramirez, Diversity and the Boardroom, 6 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN.
85, 133 (2000) [hereinafter Ramirez II] ("Our society must realize that diversity is a
source of strength. Consequently, our legal system should respond to the challenge
of diversity in a progressive manner and seek to facilitate the use of diversity to
generate value."). Other scholars have recently argued that diversity can serve to
enhance corporate governance in various ways. See Lynne L. Dallas, The New
Managerialism and Diversity on Corporate Boards of Directors, 76 TUL. L. REV.
1363, 1402, 1406 (2002) (illustrating that diversity may operate to counterbalance
shareholder primacy norms); Janis Sarra, The Gender Implications of Corporate
Governance Change, 1 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 457, 484-85, 496-97 (2002) (showing
that gender diversity within corporations can add greater depth to corporate
decision making to achieve enterprise wealth maximization rather than gendered
shareholder maximization). This Article takes a different, more narrow approach,
suggesting that the Sarbanes-Oxley reforms missed the mark by failing to consider
cultural diversity as a potential tool to combat corporate misconduct. Consequently,
this Article does not challenge the shareholder primacy norm. See Preliminary
Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on CorporateResponsibility, 54
MERCER L. REV. 789, 805 (2002) (asserting that directors should periodically
evaluate "the diversity of experience of individual directors").
14 Ramirez II, supra note 13, at 99-101; see also SUSAN F. SHULTz, THE BOARD
BOOK 128 (2001) (discussing board diversity and stating that "[a]ny CEO who has
ten or eleven people just like him sitting around the board table will end up
essentially talking to himself'); David A. Carter et al., Corporate Governance,Board
Diversity, and Firm Value, 38 FIN. REV. 33, 36 (2003) ("[D]iversity produces more
effective problem-solving. While heterogeneity may initially produce more
conflict ...the variety of perspectives that emerges causes decision makers to
evaluate more alternatives and more carefully explore the consequences of these
alternatives.").
15 Ramirez II, supra note 13, at 99 n.72 ("Groups of individuals showing a
preponderance of certain personality and social attributes may prove to be the ones
that succumb most readily to groupthink." (quoting IRVING L. JANIS, VICTIMS OF
GROUPTHINK 192 (1972) [hereinafter JANIS I])).
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assumptions. 16 Group members are seduced into compliant
conduct by the need to achieve approval from the group as a
whole. 17 Scholars in a wide range of disciplines and in a wide
variety of contexts have documented the operation of groupthink
and the key role that group homogeneity plays in "groupthink,"
as well as the18 key role that cultural diversity plays in reducing
"groupthink."
Similarly, cultural diversity enjoys strong
support as a means of combating "groupthink" in the context of
the boardroom. 19 There is every reason to believe that these
tendencies toward groupthink plague the boardrooms of
corporate America. 20 As one scholar suggests, boards enjoying
cultural diversity should perform better because board
homogeneity leads to a boardroom culture that "avoids conflict,
avoids impoliteness and as a result does not permit hard

16 See id. at 99-100 n.73 (citing IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK 250 (2d ed. 1982)
[hereinafter JANIS II] (concluding that group heterogeneity can trigger "constructive
multiple advocacy" stemming a premature consensus and leading to deeper
consideration of alternatives.).
17 JANIS II, supra note 16, at 245 ("The more amiability and esprit de corps
among members of an in-group of policy makers, the greater is the danger that
independent critical thinking will be replaced by groupthink .... ").
18 See e.g. Poppy Lauretta McLeod et al., Ethnic Diversity and Creativity in
Small Groups, 27 SMALL GROUP RES. 248, 252, 257 (1996) (finding that diverse
workgroups enjoyed decision-making advantages over homogenous work groups);
see also Karen A. John et. al., Why Differences Make a Difference: A Field Study of
Diversity, Conflict and Performance in Workgroups, 44 ADM. SCI. Q'RTLY. 741 (1999)
(finding that cultural diversity may lead to increased relationship conflict but that
benefits in performance resulting from informational diversity led to higher morale
and satisfaction).
19Jeffrey A. Sonnenfeld, What Makes Great Boards Great, HARV. BUS. REV.,
Sept. 2002, at 106. "I'm always amazed at how common groupthink is in corporate
boardrooms .... If you put [directors] into a group that discourages dissent, they
nearly always ... conform." Id. at 111. Jeffrey Sonnenfeld, Associate Dean of the
Yale School of Management, also contends that Enron did not encourage dissent
and dissenting voices resigned. Id. at 111.
20 JANIS II, supra note 16, at 242 ("Some chief executives, for example, probably
become more dependent than others on an inner circle of advisers and set up group
norms that encourage unanimity."). Very recently, one corporation beset by weak
corporate governance, Westar Energy, Inc., found, through an investigation
conducted by a Special Committee of the Board of Directors, that a lack of diversity
contributed to less than ideal standards of corporate governance. See Westar
Energy, Inc., Report of the Special Committee to the Board of Directors, April 29,
2003, at 256-58, at http://media.corporate-ir.net/media-files/nys/wr/reports/
custompage/WestarEnergy.pdf (last visited on Sept. 23, 2003). "[A] board
comprised of directors from varied backgrounds may be more likely to engage in
robust thought and debate." Id. at 257.
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questioning." 21 Diversity can be a tool to assure boards are
'bold enough to ask management the tough questions.' "22
By the summer of 2002, the problems of groupthink in the
boardroom had become manifest. 23 Compensation for senior
executives had become excessive, with boards passively
permitting senior executives to harvest billions in options
compensation while the companies they managed went
bankrupt. 24 Some of the largest companies in America, like
Enron Corporation, seemed to exist only to enrich their top
executives and to deceive public investors. Nor was Enron an
isolated circumstance.
WorldCom, NiCor, Global Crossing,
Sprint, and Merck all contributed to the drumbeat of corporate
scandals. 25
It was increasingly apparent that corporate
21 Jyoti Thottam, Crashing the Boards, TIME.COM, Feb. 10, 2003, (statement of
Harvard Business School Professor Rakesh Khurana), http://www.time.com/time/
insidebizlarticle/0,9171,1101030210-418568,00.html; see also RAKESH KHURANA,

SEARCHING FOR A CORPORATE SAVIOR 82-86 (2002) (showing that a variety of norms
and social connections, including racial and gender homogeneity renders boards
"high cohesion" groups, which leads to "a strong emphasis on politeness and
courtesy, and an avoidance of direct conflict and confrontation"); Susan S. Boren &
Julie H. Daum, Raising the Bar in the Boardroom: New Expectations and Standards
Warrant a Best PracticesReview, DIRECTORS & BOARDS, June 22, 2002, at 55 ("The
advantages of a board composed of directors who offer diversity of backgrounds,
expertise, and outlook cannot be underestimated. Directors should not only bring a
variety of knowledge and skills, but should differ enough intellectually from each
other and management to encourage a culture of scrutiny and debate.").
22 Matt Golosinski, Who Will Lead?, KELLOGG WORLD (2002), (quoting James
H. Lowery, adjunct professor and member, Dean's Advisory Board, Kellogg School of
Management,
Northwestern
University),
available at http://www.kellogg.
northwestern.edu/kwo/win02 /indepthlwhowilllead.htm.
23 According to Dean Sonnenfeld, the Enron board was a prime example of the
perils of "groupthink." Dean Sonnenfeld contends that Enron's board discouraged
dissent, seemed unwilling to ask difficult questions, and valued congeniality instead
of learning the truth. In short, Enron was plagued by "groupthink." Jeffrey
Sonnenfeld, How Go-Along Boards JamUp Firms, USA TODAY, Feb. 6, 2003, at A15.
24 See Steven A. Ramirez, Fear and Social Capitalism: The Law and
Macroeconomics of Investor Confidence, 42 WASHBURN L.J. 31, 59-62 (2002)
[hereinafter Ramirez III] (arguing that the radical deregulation of director duties in
the 1980's and 1990's created a reality which permitted management and associated
professionals to harvest excessive compensation while shareholders lost billions).
25 Id. at 31-32 (showing the parade of scandals that led to the enactment of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002). It does not appear that the cycle of corporate
corruption that started with the bankruptcy of Enron in 2001 has ceased. Very
recently, the government accused HealthSouth Corporation of inflating profits by
$1.4 billion since 1999. For the ten years between 1987 and 1997, HealthSouth's
stock price rose an average of 31% per annum. Apparently, according to the
government, the company simply made up numbers to give the illusion of
profitability. Charles Haddad et al., Too Good To Be True, BUS. WK., April 14, 2003,
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governance in America was seriously dysfunctional. 26 Public
confidence sank to historic lows, and the value of the dollar slid
as foreign investors fled the newly perceived riskiness of
American equity markets. 27 The crisis demanded government
action.
Congress responded with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
which President Bush quickly signed into law. 28 The Act was a
wide-ranging effort to restore investor confidence. 29
As
ultimately implemented by various administrative agencies, the
30
Act restructured the regulation of auditors of public companies,
enhanced criminal penalties for corporate crimes, 31 and
enhanced disclosure requirements applicable to publicly held
companies. 32 One key purpose of the Act was to secure the
independence of auditors of publicly held companies by
33
restricting the ability of auditors to consult for audit clients.
Arguably, however, the most significant impact of the Act was
the effect it had and will have on corporate governance. For
at 70. It seems that HealthSouth's auditors, Ernst & Young, missed a number of red
flags. Dean Foust, Missing the Red Flags, Bus. WK., April 14, 2003, at 72.

Ironically, Ernst & Young did not do any consulting work for HealthSouth nor did it
receive any premium payments for its auditing work. Id.
26 See Ramirez III, supra note 24, at 31-32 (illustrating that authoritative
business voices had concluded that the system of corporate governance was flawed
by the scandal-ridden summer of 2002).
27 Id. at 31-35 (demonstrating the erosion of investor confidence and decline of
the dollar).
28 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
29 The year 2002 witnessed the public exposure of corporate accounting
irregularities at some of the most well-respected U.S. companies. As a
result.., the U.S. Congress... enacted sweeping legislative.., changes
designed to alter the fundamental manner in which public companies are
governed and operated. The changes are intended to protect investors by
improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made
pursuant to the federal securities laws.
Annual Review of Federal Securities Regulation, 58 BUs. LAW. 747, 748 (2003)
[hereinafter Annual Review] (providing a detailed overview of the changes wrought
by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
30 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §§ 101-109, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 7211-19 (West
Supp. 2003) (creating a new "Public Company Accounting Oversight Board" to
regulate accounting practices for publicly held companies).
31 See id. §§ 801-807, 11 U.S.C.A. § 523, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1501, 1519-20, 1341,
1348, 1514A, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 994, 1658 (creating new shareholder fraud crimes,
expanding penalties for alteration of documents, and instructing the United States
Sentencing Commission to review penalties for corporate misconduct).
32 See id. §§ 401-409, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78m, 78p, 7262-66 (enhancing financial
disclosure practices for publicly held companies).
33 See id. § 201, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1(g).
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example, the Act essentially strips management of the power of
oversight over the audit function. 34 Similarly, the Act imposes
new, more burdensome, reporting obligations upon counsel for
publicly held companies. 35 The Act also imposes an enhanced
role for independent directors. 36
In this respect, the Act
dovetails with parallel reforms at the New York Stock Exchange
and the NASDAQ marketplace. 37 Both of these self-regulatory
organizations have power over the companies that choose to list
34

See id. § 204, 301, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78j-l(k), (in) (vesting control over the audit

function in an independent committee of the board for publicly held companies). An
independent director may not receive any compensation from the issuer other than
board fees and may not otherwise be affiliated with the issuer. Id. § 301, 15
U.S.C.A. § 78j-1(m).
35 See id. § 307, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7245 (directing the SEC to promulgate rules
requiring attorneys representing publicly held companies and appearing or
practicing before the SEC to undertake new reporting obligations for a "material
violation" of law).
36 Id. § 301, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1(m) (requiring each member of a publicly held
company's audit committee to be "independent"). In addition to requiring the
independence of the audit committee, the Act also created pressure for more
independent directors as a result of the SEC's implementation of section 307. See
generally Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68
Fed. Reg. 6296 (Feb. 6, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 205) (prescribing
minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys representing issuers
before the SEC). As part of its rule making under section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, the SEC created an innovation called the "[q]ualified legal compliance
committee." Id. at 6296, 6321 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 205.2 (k)). A qualified
legal compliance committee (QLCC) is a committee of the board that is comprised
entirely of independent directors, charged with investigating a material violation
that is reportable under Section 307 and the rules promulgated thereunder. Id. The
advantage of a QLCC is that once an attorney reports credible evidence of a
material violation to the QLCC, then the attorney has discharged his or her
obligations under the SEC's new rules of professional responsibility. Id. at 6296,
6321 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 205.3). Without a QLCC, the attorney must
monitor the response of the corporate representative to assure the response is
appropriate, and report further up the corporate ladder if the response is not
appropriate. Id. at 6296, 6321-22 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)). Moreover,
if the SEC adopts its pending "noisy withdrawal"-so-called because it would require
an attorney to withdraw if the issuer did not respond appropriately to a report from
the attorney and notify the SEC of the withdrawal-provisions, then a report to a
QLCC eliminates the prospect of a "noisy withdrawal." Id. at 6296, 6297 (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205). Consequently, there is a significant incentive to form
a QLCC, which enhances the role of independent directors on the board.
37 See generally NASDAQ, Summary of NASDAQ Corporate Governance
Proposals (Feb. 26, 2003), at http://www.nasdaq.com/about/WebCorp-GovSummary%20Feb-revised.pdf (last visited April 14, 2003); NYSE, New York Stock
Exchange Corporate Accountability and Listing Standards Committee, available at
http://www.nyse. com/pdfs/ corp.govreport.pdf (last visited April 14, 2003)
(proposing a listing rule that would require all companies listed on the NASDAQ to
have a majority of independent directors).
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their securities at these facilities. 3 8 Each has proposed new
39
requirements relating to independent directors.
All of this corporate governance reform has a common
theme.
It is aimed at undermining the grip of senior
management, particularly the CEO, over all aspects of the
business of publicly held companies. 40 The initiative does very
little to undermine management's control over core business
functions. Instead, the Act generally focuses on the monitoring
functions, such as the audit function or the legal function,
insofar as monitoring of misconduct is concerned. 4 1 Moreover,
the initiative imposes enhanced independence requirements in
the boardroom to improve its monitoring function. 42 This Article
posits that diversity on corporate boards would have served this
very purpose. In other words, Sarbanes-Oxley seems to have
missed an opportunity to harness diversity as a tool to combat
corporate corruption. This Article concludes that the failure of
Sarbanes-Oxley to explicitly use diversity in this way is not only
an important flaw in the government's reform efforts, it also
speaks loudly to the continued sway of the construct of race in
our society and our inability to recognize diversity as a source of
strength.
Part I of this Article demonstrates the utility of diversity in
the boardroom, with a view towards showing that properly
38 The listing requirements are subject to the SEC's oversight authority, like all
self-regulatory organization rules in the securities industry. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f,
78o-3 (2000).
39 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78-j(i) (2002); see also
Annual Review, supra note 29, at 761-65 (providing a detailed overview of the
NYSE and NASDAQ reforms). Proposed Rule 4200 of the NASDAQ Stock Market
provides that a director will not be independent if (1) the director is an employee of
the issuer or related to an employee of the issuer; (2) the director receives fees or
payments, other than board fees, in excess of $60,000; (3) the director is an
executive officer of a company where an executive officer of the company also served
on the compensation committee within the last three years; or (4) the director is a
partner or employee of the issuer's auditor and worked on the issuer's audit within
the last three years. Annual Review, supra note 29, at 762. The NYSE defines an
independent director in a similar fashion but also would exclude any director who
the board decides has a material relationship to the issuer. Id. at 763-64.
40 Michael Weiser & Jeff Zilka, Nader for CEO: Sarbanes-Oxley Makes Running
a CorporationLike Campaigningfor Elective Office, BARRON'S, Jan. 27, 2003, at 33
(recognizing that the upshot of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is a shift of power away from
the CEO, who must now curry the favor of a variety of newly empowered,
decentralized sources of checks and balances on CEO power).
41 See supra notes 34-35.
42 See supra notes 36-37.
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managed diversity at the board level could improve board
functioning and the quality of board decision making, as well as
enhance independent thinking that could serve as a check on
management prerogatives. Implicit in this is that diversity could
be expected to serve as an additional voice in the boardroom that
could prevent corporate corruption at an earlier stage. Part II
illustrates that while the current efforts at reform are laudable
on many fronts, the Sarbanes-Oxley reform initiative 43 failed to
properly comprehend the potential of diversity to stem corporate
corruption and fails to even mention it as a tool. 44 Indeed, it is
even possible that the net effect of the current reform efforts will
be to diminish diversity in the boardrooms of America. Part II
demonstrates that racial thinking is manifest in Sarbanes-Oxley
in that the politicians providing the energy behind the Act failed
to even consider diversity as a potential tool in the battle against
corporate corruption. The Article concludes that this entire
episode of corporate corruption and the reform efforts that
followed attest to the continued power of race in our society and
the inability to see diversity as strength, notwithstanding
political rhetoric and attitudes of tokenism to the contrary.
I. CAN BOARD DIVERSITY CREATE A NEW CULTURE OF SCRUTINY?
Ironically, authorities from the world of business already
recognize the importance of diversity in the boardroom and
specifically link the lack of diversity in corporate America to the
recent corporate corruption crisis. 45
For example, expert
43 For purposes of this Article, I define the "Sarbanes.-Oxley reform initiative"
to include the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, the
accompanying reform initiatives of the New York Stock Exchange, and the
NASDAQ Stock Market. See generally Annual Review, supra note 29, and the
related regulations of the SEC.
44 I have previously criticized the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for failing to restore
private securities litigation to its 1934-1995 vigor, when it appeared to operate to
secure investor confidence effectively, from its weakened effect following the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act. See Ramirez III, supra note 24, at 59-65 (stating
that private enforcement of the securities laws is largely immune to political
influence, does not depend upon the political caprice of the budgetary process, and
creates broader incentives for ferreting out wrongdoing). Other commentators have
critiqued the Act on a variety of other grounds. See, e.g., Mary Kreiner Ramirez,
Just in Crime: Guiding Economic Crime Reform After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 359, 377-81 (arguing that real reform of white collar
crime sentencing requires that departures be restricted).
45 Recent corporate failures among the likes of Enron, Tyco, WorldCom, and
Adelphia have turned the spotlight more intensely than ever before on boards. The
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consultants in the business of advising corporations with respect
to the best practices for board selection recognized in advance of
Sarbanes-Oxley that cultural diversity in the boardroom can act
to create a culture of scrutiny instead of a culture of greed. 46 The
American Management Association recently published The
Board Book, 47 a volume strongly endorsing diversity in the
boardroom for the specific purpose of broadening perspectives
and decision making. 48 Indeed, even before the onset of the
corporate corruption scandals of 2001 and 2002, prominent
voices in the business community articulated best practices in
corporate governance that recognized the important role that
cultural diversity plays in enhancing board functioning. 49 As
early as 1999, the Conference Board, a leading global business
organization that allows business leaders to exchange ideas
regarding best business practices 50 endorsed diverse boards as a
means of enhancing shareholder value and assuring that boards
failures suggest that inattentive and clubby boards have resulted in a kind of

groupthink that thwarts the independent thought necessary to assure good
governance. That is because good governance depends on a culture of open dissent
and members' ability to challenge assumptions and beliefs. If good governance is to
prevail, such clubby boards must give way to more engaged, skeptical, and diverse
boards.
Sally Stetson, Women on Boards, PHIL. BUS. J., Jan. 20, 2003, available at
http://philadelphia.bizjournals.com/philadelphiastories/2003/0 1/20/editorial2.html.
Of course, embracing diversity at the board level is about much more than bringing
additional people with different morphological features into the boardroom.
Diversity is not about skin color; it is about broadening an organization's
perspectives, experiences, and cultural facilities. See Ramirez II, supra note 13, at
122-23. Thus, even proponents of enhanced boardroom diversity recognize that the
cognitive benefits of enhanced diversity will not accrue in companies that suppress
dissent. See Elisabeth Marx, Bring Diversity to the Boardroom, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 8,
2003, at 14.
46 See Boren & Daum, supra note 21, at 55 (statement from senior
representatives of Spencer Stuart, a firm specializing in the placement of directors
and advising companies with respect to director searches, that diversity can help
assure that "important questions are raised" and that the Enron Corporation lacked
this kind of diversity); Marx, supra note 45, at 14 (stating that companies in the
Unites States that value diversity seem to perform better and that more diverse
boards are able to deal more effectively with business complexities).
47 SCHULTZ, supra note 14.
48 Id. at 128.
49 HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 187-94 (2000)
(statement of Chairman of the Board of General Motors, regarding the GM core
principles of corporate governance, which include valuing board diversity for the
purpose of adding valuable perspectives).
50 Ramirez II, supra note 13, at 97 n.57 (explaining the purpose and goals of the
Conference Board).
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can act in a constructively critical manner.5 1 In that report,
leading American voices termed diversity at the board level a
strategic imperative. 52 Thus, it is clear that the basic idea that
diversity can add "vital, diverse perspectives" that could serve as
an element of increased independence was well understood in
the world of business at the very time that incipient political
pressure was gathering to reform corporate governance. 53 In fact,
at many companies, proxy battles raged over this issue at the
54
insistence of sophisticated institutional investors.
Institutional shareholders have long sought to encourage
more diverse boards in corporate America. In the early 1990s,
TIAA-CREF, one of the nation's largest institutional investors,
issued its "Policy Statement on Corporate Governance" that
emphasized the desirability of diverse boards. 55 More recently,
TLAA-CREF highlighted that it considered diversity in
"experience, gender, race and age" as a director qualification. 56
TIAA-CREF believes that more diversity will cause boards to be
less beholden to management. 57 CalPERS, a large institutional
investor representing the financial interests of California state
employees, also values board diversity. 58 Other institutional
51 CAROLYN KAY BRANCATO & D. JEANNE PATTERSON, BOARD DIVERSITY IN
U.S. CORPORATIONS: BEST PRACTICES FOR BROADENING THE PROFILE OF
CORPORATE BOARDS 7 (1999) (The Conference Bd., Research Report No. 1230-99-

RR, 1999) (quoting John H. Bryan, Chairman and CEO of Sara Lee Corp.).
52 Id. (quoting John H. Bryan, Chairman and CEO of Sara Lee Corp.).
53 For example, the Conference Board's articulation of the business case in
favor of diversity in the boardroom had been reviewed and analyzed by
management resources on the internet as of October 8, 2001. See Management
First, Diversity in the Boardroom? (Oct. 8, 2001), at http://www.
managementfirst.com/management-styles/articlesboardroom.php?pv= 1.
54 See, e.g., Ross Kerber, Board Battle Heats up at EMC: Shareholder Activists
Urge Directors To Be More Independent, Diverse, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 24, 2002, at
El; see also Carter et al., supra note 14, at 34 (recounting board diversity battles at
Texaco, First Data, Unocal, Circuit City Stores, Sprint, and York International).
55 See CARY & EISENBERG, supra note 2, at 253.
56 TIAA-CREF, Policy Statement on Corporate Governance (March 2000),
available at http://www.tiaacref.org/ libra/governance.
57 Id. It is noteworthy that women acted as whistleblowers both at Enron and
WorldCom and were able to overcome cultures riven with groupthink. See Geoffrey
Colvin, Wonder Women of Whistleblowing, FORTUNE, Aug. 12, 2002, at 56.
58 CAL. PUB. EMPLOYEES RET. SYS., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORE
PRINCIPLES & GUIDELINES: THE UNITED STATES 6 (Apr. 13, 1998) ("With each

director nomination recommendation, the board [should] consideru the mix of
director characteristics, experiences, diverse perspectives and skills that is most
appropriate for the company."), available at http://www.calpers-governance.
org/principles/domestic/us/downloads/us-corpgov-principles.pdf.
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investors have similarly recognized the value of cultural
59
diversity.
The support that enhanced board diversity recieves from
sophisticated institutional investors stems from a powerful
theoretical basis. 60 Specifically, diverse groups have superior
cognitive skills in relation to homogenous groups. 61 Diversity
can lead to enhanced creativity, group flexibility, and deeper
insights.62 Naturally, this results in the ability to better manage
environmental complexity. 63
Such group action should
59 See, e.g., Calvert Online, Issue Brief, Board Diversity, (Oct. 2002) ("Diverse
boards offer expanded perspectives and have been shown to improve the quality of
corporate deliberations and policymaking."), at http://www.calvert.com/SRI_
newsArticle.asp?article=946&image=ib.jpg&keepleftnav=Issue+Briefs. Calvert uses
diversity as an investment screen because "diversity is crucial to a well-functioning
board and ...companies that value diversity at every level of the organization tend
to fare better than those that do not." Id. Recently, the State of Connecticut
launched a "Board Diversity Initiative" specifically to promote diversity on the
boards of the companies in which its $20 billion state retirement funds invest. See
Laurie Ledgard, Nappier Fights for Diversity, Independence Issues in Boardrooms,
HARTFORD Bus. J., May, 20, 2002, http://www.state.ct.us/ott/morenews/morenews
052002.pdf (last visited Aug. 26, 2003).
60 See Daniel P. Forbes & Frances J. Milliken, Cognition and Corporate
Governance: Understanding Boards of Directors as Strategic Decision-Making
Groups, 24 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 489, 494-99 (1999) (stating that heterogeneous
boards benefit from cognitive conflict that results in a more thorough consideration
of problems and solutions).
61 One study of the advantages of ethnically diverse work groups found that
heterogeneous workgroups produced ideas that were superior to those of
homogenous work groups. See McLeod et al., supra note 18, at 256-57 ("The ideas
produced by the heterogeneous groups were judged as significantly more feasible ...
and more effective ...than the ideas produced by the homogenous groups."); see
also Patricia Gurin et al., Diversity and Higher Education: Theory and Impact on
Educational Outcomes, 72 HARV. EDUC. REV. 330, 336-39, 352 (2002) (finding that
a diverse educational environment encourages "active thinking and intellectual
engagement" instead of "mindless" or "automatic thinking").
62 See Deborah
H. Gruenfeld et al., Cognitive Flexibility, Communication
Strategy, and Integrative Complexity in Groups: Public Versus Private Reactions to
Majority and Minority Status, 34 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 202, 219-20
(1998) (finding that minority influence enhances the integrative complexity of
majority decision makers); see also Charlan Jeanne Nemeth, Differential
Contributions of Majority and Minority Influence, 93 PSYCHOL. REV. 23, 28 (1986)
("Those exposed to minority viewpoints ...are in fact stimulated to think in more
divergent ways. They are more original, they use a greater variety of strategies,
they detect novel solutions, and importantly, they detect correct solutions."); Harry
C. Triandis et al., Member Heterogeneity and Dyadic Creativity, 18 HuM. REL. 33, 52
(1965) (finding that diverse groups are more creative).
63 See Carter et al., supra note 14, at 36 ("The result of diversity at the top is a
better understanding of the complexities of the environment and more astute
decisions.").
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discourage groupthink and create an additional check on
management prerogative as the board achieves superior
monitoring ability.64 "In terms of manager-monitoring, diversity
'may promote the airing of different perspectives and reduce the
probability of complacency and narrow-mindedness in a board's
evaluation of executive proposals.' "65 Diversity theory, however,
predicts additional benefits beyond monitoring ability.66 Diverse
boards should enhance a variety of important stakeholder
relationships for the corporation and improve the corporation's
access to a deeper pool of human talent. 67 The same cognitive
skills that lead to the benefits of enhanced monitoring should
improve board functioning across the entire range of its
responsibility. In other words, the deployment of diversity at the
board level will likely lead to broad benefits, including enhanced
monitoring skills. 68 Separating the benefits of board diversity in
a way that highlights its utility in enhancing the board's
cognitive ability as a tool against corporate misconduct is
69
therefore problematic.
The most recent empirical evidence is a study on the effects
of diversity on group interaction which shows that board
diversity can enhance cognitive skills in a way that can be useful
See infra note 66 (discussing the benefits of board diversity).
Dallas, supra note 13, at 1400 (quoting Jerry Goldstein et al., The Effects of
Board Size and Diversity on Strategic Change, 15 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 241, 243
(1994)).
66 See Carter et al., supra note 14, at 36. The full case for diversity at the board
level has been summarized to include the following benefits: (1) diversity should
provide additional insights that may be helpful for superior international market
penetration, (2) diversity sparks innovation and creativity, (3) diversity leads to
greater problem solving skills, (4) diversity broadens corporate perspectives, and (5)
diversity provides for more effective relationships with global constituencies. Id.
67 See Margaret L. Williams & Talya N. Bauer, The Effect of a Managing
64

65

Diversity Policy on OrganizationalAttractiveness, 19 GROUP & ORG. MGMT. 295,

305-06 (1994) (finding that firms that manage diversity well will achieve
advantages in attracting employees).
68 See supra notes 45, 66-67.
69 This lack of severability of the benefits yielded by enhanced cultural diversity
at the board level causes little hesitancy among international business leaders.
They continue to recommend cultural diversity in the boardroom, for the express
purpose of achieving superior cognition to improve governance. International
Business Leaders Forum & Sustainability, The Power to Change: Mobilizing Board
Leadership to Deliver Sustainable Value to Markets and Society, Executive
Summary (2001) available at http://www.iblf.org/csr/csrwebassist. nsf/content/
fld2a3b4c5.html ("Access to a diversity of nationalities, skills, professional
experiences, genders, ethnicities and ages can enable a board to have better radar,
better decision-making and better governance.").
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in the battle against corporate wrongdoing.70
The study
attempted to explain why diversity had previously been
associated with positive intellectual outcomes for college
students. 71
Significantly, the study concluded that group
interactions benefited from increased integrative complexity
when racial diversity was increased. 72
This benefit was
enhanced if group members were exposed to less racial diversity
in prior, pre-study interactions. 73 Integrative complexity allows
groups to approach problems from multiple perspectives and
with enhanced critical thinking. 74 This can be a critical element
to combat "groupthink."7 5 The authors of the study concluded
that increased racial diversity lead to "increased integrative
complexity" particularly in a context where subjects had "less
contact with members of other racial groups and if they [were]
older." 76 They also concluded that while their study involved
only a single experimental session, "1l]ogically we would expect
that sustained exposure to a diverse environment would lead to
even larger effects."7 7 Certainly, it would be ideal to have more
compelling studies that demonstrate the ability of cultural
diversity to specifically stem corporate corruption in the specific
context of the boardroom. Nevertheless, this study contributes
to a number of similar studies broadly showing that cultural
diversity enhances group cognitive functioning by combating the
kind of groupthink that has allowed the boardrooms of corporate
70 Anthony Lising Antonio et al., Effects of Racial Diversity on Complex
Thinking in College Students, http://siher.stanford.edu/documents/pdfs/racial_

diversity.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2003).
71 Id. at 2 (citing DARYL G. SMITH ET AL., DIVERSITY WORKS: THE EMERGING
PICTURE OF HOW STUDENTS BENEFIT (1997) (stating that overall diversity
initiatives positively affect students and enhance academic growth); ALEXANDER W.
ASTIN,

WHAT MATTERS IN COLLEGE?: FOUR CRITICAL YEARS REVISITED (1993);

Mitchell J. Chang, Does Racial Diversity Matter?: The Educational Impact of a
Radically Diverse UndergraduatePopulation,40 J.C. STUDENT DEV. 377, 391 (1999)

(finding that a racially diverse student body contributes to the education of all
students); Patricia Gurin, Expert Report of Patricia Gurin, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L.
363, 364 (1999) ("Diversity of all forms in the student body-including racial
diversity-is crucially important in helping students become conscious learners and
critical thinkers, and in preparing them for participation in a pluralistic, diverse
society.").
72 Antonio, supra note 70, at 9-10.
73 Id. at 10-11.
74 Id. at 5.
76 Id. (citing JANIS I, supra note 15).
76 Id. at 11.

77Id.
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America to devolve into quiescent instruments of corporate
7s
corruption.
The most insightful study of the direct relationship between
board diversity and corporate corruption is from the experience
of Canada with respect to diverse boards. The Conference Board
of Canada conducted a study of differences in corporate
governance outcomes between firms with diverse boards and
firms without diverse boards. 79 The study utilized the number of
women on the board for the purposes of testing the outcomes of
diverse boards.8 0 It found that 94% of boards with three or more
women ensured compliance with internal conflict of interest
guidelines, while only 68% of all male boards ensured such
compliance. 8 1 Eighty-six percent of boards with three or more
women imposed a code of conduct upon their corporations, while
only 66% of non-diverse boards undertook this basic step in
corporate governance.8 2 The diverse boards also assumed the
corporate governance responsibilities recommended to boards by
the Toronto Stock Exchange at a greater frequency than nondiverse boards.8 3 The study concluded that "[d]iversity on
boards, here represented by the presence of women on boards,
does change the functioning and deliberative style of the board
in clear and consistent ways."8 4 Thus, this study directly
78 JANIS II, supra note 16; see also Carter et al., supra note 14; Carol Hymowitz,
What's Your Solution? We Asked Some Experts and Here's What They Said, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 24, 2003, at R8 (statement of Dr. Kenneth Eisold, a New York
psychoanalyst and President of the International Society for Psychoanalytic Study
of Organizations, discussing that boards too often tend towards groupthink and fail
to dissent as a means of avoiding uncomfortable confrontations and preserving
group cohesion); Joe Stephens & Peter Behr, Enron's Culture Fed Its Demise;
Groupthink Promoted Foolhardy Risks, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2002, at Al

(recounting how the corporate culture at Enron insisted upon a degree of loyalty
that led to groupthink).
79 DAVID A. BROWN ET AL., WOMEN ON BOARD: NOT JUST THE RIGHT THING...
BUT THE BRIGHT THING, CONFERENCE BOARD OF CANADA i-ii (The Conference Bd.

of Canada, Report, May, 2002).
80 Id. at 6.
81 Id.
82

Id.

Id. at ii (using a measure of diversity of two or more women on a board;
diverse boards assumed 94% of the recommendations, while non-diverse boards
assumed only 72% of the recommendations).
83

84

Id. "By bringing distinct perspectives to the attention of the organization's

board and executive, diverse board members serve to create constructive dissent
and to ensure due diligence. It is the homogeneous board that lacks both diversity
and unity because it lacks meaningful dissent and deliberation." Id. at 14.
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supports the conclusion that board diversity can instill a culture
of scrutiny.8 5 A similar study focusing on corporations in the
Unites States recently considered the effects of gender diversity
on corporate governance.8 6 This study found that boards with
greater gender diversity tended to meet more often than nondiverse boards and were more likely to link director pay to
performance.8 7
Unfortunately, both of these studies are
somewhat limited due to the fact that each uses a narrow proxy
for cultural diversity, specifically gender diversity.8 8
Nevertheless, it is fairly clear that cultural diversity on
boards adds shareholder value.8 9 One recent study specifically
85 Id. "When all board members are 'cut from the same cloth,' the board can
become an 'old boys network,' widely-acknowledged as a major contributing cause to
ineffective boards, poor governance and some of the most spectacular failures we
have witnessed in ... [the] corporate... sectoro in the past decade." Id. at 5.
86 See Renee B. Adams & Danial Ferreira, Diversity and Incentives in Teams:
Evidence from Corporate Boards, at 1, at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=32 1095 (July 2001).
87 Id. The authors of this study utilized data from 1,462 publicly traded firms in
the United States during 1998. Id. at 3, 11. The study concluded that board
homogeneity and incentive pay for directors were substitutes, meaning that firms
that found diversity cost-prohibitive woula substitute homogeneity for the enhanced
incentive pay necessary to assure team loyalty. Id. at 2-4. To the extent that this
study implies that diversity is costly relative to board homogeneity, it seems at odds
with the authors' further finding that diversity enhances firm market valuations.
Id. at 15 ("While it is not the goal of this study to interpret this finding, it is
interesting to register the fact that higher market valuation is associated with more
women on boards."). Indeed, given the authors' central finding that stock volatility,
incentive pay for directors, and diversity are related, it could be that the authors
have shown that companies that value board diversity also are interested in
incentive-pay for directors and that this coincidence serves to fuel superior financial
performance while minimizing risk. See id. at 4, 21. After all, authorities have
deemed both incentive pay and board diversity as best practice and both are
seemingly associated with superior performance. SHULTZ, supra note 14, at 105-09,
128-38.
88 For purposes of this Article, when I use the term "cultural diversity," I mean
to include both gender diversity and racioethnic diversity. Both of these dimensions
of diversity inject a different perspective into the boardroom, as evidenced by the
various empirical analyses showing a difference in outputs when either form of
diversity is present. See BROWN ET AL., supra note 79; McLeod et al., supra note 18.
Individuals offering either type of diversity are clearly not in the "club" and have
been historically deprived of the ability to actualize their full potential. See supra
text accompanying notes 6-11. Thus, it seems both groups break-up the tradition of
gender and racioethnic homogeneity. Nevertheless, in an abundance of caution, I
pause before applying the learning from gender diversity to racioethnic diversity,
even though I cannot think of a good reason to do so.
89 Infra note 97 and accompanying text; see also BROWN ET AL., supra note 79,
at 12 (correlating diversity to enhanced financial performance in Canada,
measuring diversity by two or more women on the board, and controlling for

HeinOnline -- 77 St. John's L. Rev. 852 2003

2003]

DIVERSITY QUELLING CORPORATE CORRUPTION

85"

examined "the relationship between board diversity and firm
value for Fortune 1000 firms." 90 For purposes of the study, the
authors defined board diversity to mean the degree of inclusion
of women, African-Americans, Asians, and Hispanics at the
board level. 91 The study compared the financial performance
between firms with significant diversity at the board level-two
or more women or minorities-with those with no diversity, after
controlling for a series of potentially exogenous factors. 92 The
authors concluded: "After controlling for size, industry, and other
corporate governance measures, we find statistically significant
positive relationships between the presence of women or
minorities on the board and firm value. '93 This conclusion finds
broad support in a number of similar studies, from such
94
ethnically diverse places as South Africa.
Another study found that if a firm was selected to Fortune
magazine's diversity elite, it subsequently exhibited a
significantly higher return on equity relative to peers. 95 This
diversity elite generally is selected based upon the degree to
which the firm implements practices in hiring, retention, and
compensation that create and sustain a diverse workforce. 96
Such firms are associated with abnormally high shareholder
returns and higher return on assets, as well as higher return on
equity. 97 Notably, however, the study found that "greater value
industry).
90 Carter, supra note 14, at 33.
91 Id. at 36 ("Overall, we find a positive significant relationship between board
diversity and firm value.").
92 Id. at 44.
93 Id. at 51.
94 See S. Mitchell Williams, Relationship Between Board Structure and a

Firm's Intellectual Capital Performance in an Emerging Economy 2 (demonstrating
a positive correlation between board diversity and financial performance based upon
a study of 84 publicly held companies listed in South Africa), at
http://www.measuring-ip.at/English/papers.html (last modified Nov. 11, 2000); see
also Amy J. Hillman & Albert A. Cannella, Jr., Diversity on the Board and Firm
Performance: The Mediating Role of Stakeholder Management, (finding a positive
correlation between board diversity and 242 S&P 500 firms from 1997-1999;
concluding that "our evidence suggests that diversity is not merely media hype or
public sentiment, but that quantifiable and positive results can come from a diverse
board of directors") (working paper on file with author).
95 Phyllis Y. Keys et al., Shareholder Benefits of Diversity 4-5 (Apr. 2002), at
http://www.blackfinancialeconomist.orgbfenmaterials/working%20papers/keys/dive
rsity.PDF (working paper on file with author).
96 Id. at 4.
97 Id. at 5.
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is added when diversity promoters include individuals of various
ethnic backgrounds in higher level positions ... where decisionmaking authority and influence are greater."9 8 The authors
acknowledge that it is not clear why diversity adds value. 99 Still,
their finding that diversity at the senior levels of corporate
governance is associated with particularly strong gains in
shareholder value is entirely consistent with a finding that board
diversity enhances board functioning. 100 Thus, a diverse board
adds shareholder value and assures better corporate governance
whether tested in South Africa, Canada, or the United States;
the empirical evidence in support of this conclusion is mounting
and persuasive. 10 1
The case for diversity in the boardroom is strong, even
allowing for the lack of direct and exacting empirical proof that
cultural diversity would serve to quell corporate corruption.
Respected authorities within the business world posit that
cultural diversity in the boardroom, properly managed, should
98 Id. at 22-23.
99 Id. at 23.
100 Id. at 22-23. This study is consistent with prior studies that also positively
correlated stock market performance with the disclosure of positive events tending
to show that a company had embraced diversity. See Janine S. Hiller & Stephen P.
Ferris, Separating Myth from Reality: An Economic Analysis of Voluntary
Affirmative Action Programs, 23 MEM. ST. L. REV. 773, 795 (1993) (finding that
stock market price reacts positively to efforts to embrace diversity and negatively to
news indicating companies have not embraced diversity); Peter Wright et al.,
Competitiveness Through Management of Diversity: Effects on Stock Price Valuation,
38 ACAD. MGMT. J. 272, 280-84 (1995); see also Women and Profits, HARV. BUS.
REV., Nov. 2001, at 30 (reporting on a study by Professor Roy Adler finding that
firms that most effectively shattered the glass ceiling for women also beat industry
peers in profitability).
101 Each of the above-discussed studies also supports the broader point that
corporate governance matters to financial performance. This has been a surprisingly
controversial point, but recent evidence seems to increasingly suggest that corporate
governance does indeed influence financial performance. See, e.g., Ira M. Millstein &
Paul W. MacAvoy, The Active Board of Directors and Performance of the Large
Publicly Traded Corporation,98 COLUM. L. REV. 1295, 1317-18 (1998) (finding that
"superior performance is a result of activist corporate governance," as measured,
inter alia, by adherence to the CalPers principles of corporate governance); see also
BROWN ET AL., supra note 79, at 1-2 (finding that recent research has linked
corporate performance to corporate governance practices such as a high degree of
activist monitoring of management). Moreover, in light of recent corporate
governance failures, capital markets are very likely to begin to enhance the degree
to which effective corporate governance is impounded into the market prices of
stocks; indeed, recently Standard & Poors began to rate companies based upon the
quality of their corporate governance. S&P Unveils 'Transparency' Study, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 16, 2002, at C5.
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act to create a culture of scrutiny and displace a culture of
"groupthink."'10 2 These authorities increasingly suggest that
cultural diversity is the best corporate governance practice. 103 In
addition, a growing body of empirical evidence in related
contexts strongly suggests that cultural diversity in the
boardroom would enhance cognitive group functioning in a way
that is inconsistent with a culture of corporate corruption and,
therefore, supports authorities' conclusions. 104
Thus, the
theoretical case for cultural diversity as a tool for greater
corporate integrity is sound.
Moreover, strong empirical
evidence suggests a link between firm financial performance and
cultural diversity in the boardroom. 05 While these studies
cannot pinpoint the source of enhanced value to be the creation
of a culture of scrutiny, shareholder value in the end is
shareholder value, regardless of the precise source of enhanced
value. 10 6 In other words, even if cultural diversity does not
enhance corporate governance integrity with the anticipated
degree of efficacy, it is still likely to produce other benefits.10 7 In
sum, there is little risk to facilitating increased board diversity
and likely significant gains in doing so, including the prospect of
quelling corporate corruption.
Therefore, the case for proactive measures to encourage
greater cultural diversity in the boardroom of corporate America
has been made. This is particularly so when the case for cultural
diversity is measured against the case in support of the actual
reforms undertaken pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, as the
next section of this Article demonstrates. It is also noteworthy
that the case for increased cultural diversity in the boardroom is
now a high profile corporate governance issue internationally,
explicitly for the purpose of creating an additional safeguard
against corporate misconduct. The case for increased board

102

See supra notes 14-23.

103 See supra notes 21, 46-47.

106

See supra notes 18, 79, 90.
See supra notes 66, 68-69.
See supra note 100.

107

Indeed, in addition to the studies cited above showing the general value of

104
105

board diversity on corporate financial performance, see supra notes 89-101, there

are additional studies showing that corporations that generally embrace diversity
sufficiently to be named to the "diversity elite" by Fortune are associated with
superior shareholder wealth as measured by stock performance after publication of
the ranking. See supra note 95.
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diversity is strong enough internationally that several advanced
economies are ahead of the United States in terms of the actual
steps taken to facilitate more diversity in the boardroom, as the
next section also demonstrates.
II. WILL THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
LEAD TO LESS BOARD DIVERSITY?

Given the compelling nature of the case for diversity at the
board level, it is unclear why the commanding heights of
corporate America seem to lag in diversifying themselves,
relative to a society that is generally on the cusp of an era of
rapid diversification.1 08 At its most basic level, the cause of the
problem is simple: Board directors select corporate officers, and
corporate officers select directors. 10 9 In a publicly held company,
it takes a proxy fight for shareholders to nominate and elect a
director, and this is an expensive process. 11 0 Thus, directors are
108 See Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the
Intellectual Test Performance of African Americans, 69 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHO. 797 (1997) (demonstrating how racial disparities in intelligence tests are
attributable to stereotype threat, which acts to compromise performance in areas
where groups of individuals are subjected to negative stereotypes). Compare
Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Roadmap: Is the Marketplace Theory for Eradicating
Discriminationa Blind Alley, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 215, 219 (1998) (arguing that a free
market is not likely to eradicate unfair discrimination because the market will
permit actors to exercise negative elements of human nature, including selfdestructive and oppressive tendencies, perpetuating a legacy of discrimination),
with GLENN C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY 8-9 (2002) (showing

the continuing power of racial stereotypes and racial stigma to perpetuate and
legitimate inequalities through self-confirming social interactions, e.g., when a bank
is less likely to extend funds to African-American borrowers because of the
assumption that blacks have higher default rates). Perhaps the only point that
seems clear is that corporate managers are generally not acting as rational
maximizers striving to enhance shareholder value as a means of achieving higher
compensation in the corporate manager market. See generally supra notes 6-11, 89101.
109 Although there has been some progress, CEOs generally dominate the
director selection process. See SHULTZ, supra note 14, at 26-27 (stating that CEOs
typically select directors, that the board rubber-stamps the CEO's selection and that
shareholders are given little voice in the process); see also BRANCATO & PATTERSON,
supra note 51, at 20 ("In the United States, the CEO has traditionally been the...
the main driver of the recruitment process for new board members.").
Formalistically, the shareholders elect the board. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
211(b) (2001). In a publicly held company, however, the shareholders are not
permitted to nominate directors, short of a proxy contest. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a8(i)(8) (2002). Thus, elections for directors typically look like elections in the former
communist bloc, with only one candidate running. See SHULTZ, supra note 14, at 27.
110 See Designed by Committee: Corporate Governance, ECONOMIST, June 15,
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selected by management and not elected by shareholders.'1 1 The
net effect of this system of corporate governance is a mutually
reinforcing mechanism by which elites perpetuate an exclusive
tradition. 112 In particular, the perpetuation of the tradition of
gender and race exclusion finds ready explanation in the clublike atmosphere permeating most corporate boards and the
desire of most business executives to stock their boards with
known individuals who are unlikely to prove to be a wild card.1 1 3
In short, those at the helm of the American corporate governance
structure are given little incentive to stop replicating themselves
in the boardroom and the executive suite. 1 4 Slow progress has
been the result." 5 It seems as though the corporate boardroom
has a long racial half-life, in that entrenched exclusivity is
structurally embedded at the pinnacle of American corporate
governance through the operation of corporate law and the
preexisting power structure from the bygone era of American
apartheid.1 1 6 The erosion of this racial and gender homogeneity
17
has proven slow indeed.
Unfortunately, it is uncertain whether the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act will serve to increase diversity or diminish diversity in the

2002, at 71 (recounting a proxy contest at Hewlett-Packard in which the company
spent $150 million to fend off a proxy challenge brought by the company founder,
Walter Hewitt).
M See id. ("The CEO puts up the candidates, no one runs against them and
management counts the votes.") (quoting shareholder activist Nell Minow of the
Corporate Library).
112 See Michael L. Diamond, Women Still Make up Only a Small Percentage of
Corporate Boards, KNIGHT-RIDDER TRIB. Bus. NEWS, Sept. 29, 2002, available at
2002 WL 101157423. "Historically, executives appointed directors with whom they
felt comfortable. They retained their power and rarely heard dissent." Id. (quoting
Rutgers University Business Professor Briance Mascaranhas). Of course, this leads
to a rubber-stampped board that is prone to abuse. See id. Professor Mascaranhas
recommends more diversity to combat this tendency towards homogeneity and
groupthink. Id.
113 See Strauss, supra note 6, at B1.
114 See SHULTZ, supra note 14, at 129 (stating that diversity is being
"shortstopped" because "we all want to clone ourselves" and "we put people on
boards because we trust them; we know them; we admire them; we identify with
them," and "[w]e play golf with them").
115 For example, women have made more progress than people of color. See
supra notes 6-8, 10-11 and text accompanying notes. Nevertheless, at the current
pace experts expect women to reach parity on boards in no less than five decades.
See Diamond, supra note 112.
116 See supra notes 6-8, 10-11 and accompanying text.
117 See supra note 112.
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boardrooms of corporate America.' 1 8 It is certain that the Act
does not mention diversity, notwithstanding its wide-ranging,
even revolutionary, federalization of corporate governance for
publicly held companies. The regulations that the SEC has
promulgated under the Act also do not mention the term
"diversity" or make any reference to the benefits of a diverse
board. Similarly, the legislative history of the Act fails to
support any inference that Congress intended the Act to foster
diversity in the boardroom. It is therefore clear that diversity in
the boardroom was not something that Congress considered or
intended to further. It simply was not on the legislative radar.
For example, in the legislative activity leading up to the
enactment
of Sarbanes-Oxley,
the
Senate
specifically
investigated the causes of the Enron debacle."19 The Senate
found that the Enron board "fail[ed] to recognize its fiduciary
obligations.., oversee management, and ensure responsible
financial reporting;"'120 "knowingly allowed Enron to conduct
billions of dollars in off-the-books activity to make its financial
condition appear better than it was;"'12' "approved excessive
compensation;"'' 22 and even waived compliance with the
company's own code of conduct. 23 In short, the board at Enron
failed to monitor management, failed to question management,
and failed to critically analyze the fundamental nature of
Enron's business.
One corporate governance authority has
termed these failures "almost inconceivable."'' 24 According to
this expert, the directors at Enron viewed management through
"heavily tinted ... rose-colored lenses," in that they "consistently
failed to question [Enron's] transactions or ... accounting

118 See Lisa Girion, Corporate Scandals Put Directors in the Hot Seat, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 17, 2002, at C1 ("[E]fforts to achieve racial and gender diversity are
taking a back seat these days to the pursuit of independence and expertise,
according to recruiters and corporate governance experts."); Tannette Johnson-Elie,
Scandals May Hamper Efforts To Boost Board Diversity, MILWAUKEE. J. SENTINEL,

Dec. 18, 2002, at D1 (stating that with the focus on meeting the new requirements
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, some companies may further neglect board diversity).
119 See S. REP. No. 107-70 (2002).
120 Id. at 14.
121 Id. at 38.
122 Id. at 52.
123 See id. at 24-25.
124 Janis Sarra, Rose Colored Glasses, Opaque Financial Reporting, and
Investor Blues: Enron as Con and the Vulnerability of CanadianCorporateLaw, 76
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 715, 723 (2002).
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practices," even though they had access to information and storm
warnings suggesting much was amiss. 125 In short the problem at
126
Enron was "groupthink."'
This same expert, Professor Janis Sarra of the University of
British Columbia, concludes that one of the fundamental
problems leading to Enron's downfall was the lack of diversity on
its board.1 27 The directors exhibited many of the symptoms of
"groupthink." The culture created a need for conformity and
diverse views were not brought to bear.128 This led to an inability
to raise important questions and to a failure to challenge group
decisions. 29 Thus, corporate governance scholars suggest that
"shared backgrounds, financial incentives to bond together, and
a board culture promoting unquestioning loyalty to Enron
officers, prevented the Enron board from critically evaluating
decisions, and led to a sense of invulnerability in risk-taking
decisions."' 30 All of this may smack of hindsight, except that this
analysis of what was wrong at Enron mirrors the best practices
developed by leading and authoritative business management
and corporate governance experts long before Enron went bust in
November of 2002.131 Simply put, Enron ignored all of the
evidence supporting the potential of diversity and predictably
32
suffered the ill effects of doing so.'
On the other hand, Enron, as well as many of the other
headline-grabbing participants in the parade of corporate
corruption that occurred beginning in 2001, complied with many
of the reform efforts passed in the wake of its implosion. 133 For
Id. at 720.
See Thomas R. Horton, Groupthink in the Boardroom, DIRECTORS &
BOARDS, Jan. 1, 2002, at 9 (associating Enron's downfall with groupthink in its
125

126

boardroom).
127 Sarra, supra note 124, at 728.
128 See id.
129Id.
130Id. at 729 (citing Marlene O'Connor, Address at the American and Canadian
Law and Society Joint Conference (June 2002)); see also Lynne Dallas,
Developments in CorporateGovernance in U.S. Boards of Directors and the Multiple
Roles of Corporate Boards, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN GLOBAL CAPITAL
MARKETS (2003).
131 Empirical data suggested that embracing diversity would enhance stock
performance as early as 1993. See supra note 100. The theoretical business case for

diversity was developed throughout the early and mid-1990s. Ramirez II, supranote
13, at 90-109.
132 See supra notes 119-24.
133See Ramirez III, supra note 24, at 31-32.
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example, the most recent culprit, HealthSouth, did not have any
consulting relationship with its auditing firm, and the audit
function appeared to be central to its failing. 134 In many ways,
the boards of many of the most notorious corporate failures call
into question the very idea of whether structural and procedural
rules regarding boards are the solution to the problem of
corporate governance at all. Dean Sonnenfeld contends that
many of the victims had highly independent boards, and it is
difficult to discern between well managed companies and poorly
managed ones on the basis of this criterion. 135 Instead, Dean
Sonnenfeld contends that the reform focus should be on the
social dynamics of the board. 136 Dean Sonnenfeld cites empirical
evidence showing that the highest performing companies have
"extremely contentious" boards. 13 7 These companies create a
board culture that "regard[s] dissent as an obligation and...
treat[s] no subject as undiscussable. '1 3 8 This evidence fully
supports the theoretical and empirical basis for diversity in the
boardroom; diverse boards will break down the social
homogeneity that gives rise to groupthink. 39 Thus, this is
further evidence of the power of diversity and suggests that
Sarbanes-Oxley has failed to address the root cause of the recent
spate of corporate corruption.
Despite all of the evidence in support of the need for greater
diversity in America's boardrooms, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act takes
only a modest approach at enhancing the cognitive skills of the
boardroom. Specifically, the Act imposes relatively limited
independence requirements.1 40 The Act mandates that the audit
committee be independent 4 and that the chair of the audit
committee be a financial expert.1 4 2 In addition, if a corporation
See Foust, supra note 25; Haddad et al., supra note 25.
See Sonnenfeld, supra note 19, at 106-08.
136 See id. at 106 ("Viewing the breakdowns through the lens of my 25 years
studying board performance... [w]e need to consider not only how we structure the
work of a board but also how we manage the social system a board actually is.").
137 Id. at 111 (referring to data complied by Eisenhardt and L.J. Bourgeois); see
John et. al., supra note 18 (showing that cultural diversity is associated with high
relationship conflict as well as better performance and higher group satisfaction).
138 Id.
139 Id. ("I'm always amazed at how common groupthink is in corporate
boardrooms.").
140 See supra notes 28-39.
141 See supra note 34.
142 See supra note 34.
134
135
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opts to have a qualified legal compliance committee, at least a
majority of the members of such committee must be
independent. 143
Certainly, these are positive
steps.
Nevertheless, Enron had thirteen of fifteen directors that would
likely have fit the modest independence 144 definition that is the
linchpin of these requirements, and it had an apparently
independent financial expert chairing its audit committee. 145 On
the other hand, it had only one woman on the board and only one
person of color: Wendy Gramm, the wife of Texas Senator Phil
Gramm, represented both of these people. 146 Rather than impose
any regulatory mandate or incentive for boards to diversify
themselves, Congress essentially prescribed rules that Enron
itself adhered to in order to stem any prospect of recurring
47
Enrons. 1
This approach should be contrasted to the approach of other
developed economies. Israel has required government companies

143
144

See supra note 36.
See Sarra, supra note 124, at 728.

145 See Dan Feldstein, The Fall of Enron, HOUS. CHRON., Feb. 4, 2002, at 1
(discussing the fact that the chair of the Enron audit committee was a former Dean
of the Stanford Business School). While at least one Enron director had a consulting

agreement with the company, it does not appear that a significant number would

have been deemed not to be independent in accordance with the SEC's definitions of
independence. See id. In fact, many had conflicts that are still permitted under the
new definition of "independence." For example, at least two directors were affiliated
with charitable organizations that received significant donations from Enron. Id.

This would not run afoul of the SEC's definition. See supra note 36. There is some
likelihood that a few of the Enron directors would not be deemed independent under
the NYSE rules, but a majority would under those rules. Thus, Enron would have
been in compliance with the NYSE requirement that a majority of directors be
independent. See supra note 39.
146 See Sonnenfeld, supra note 19, at 111 (discussing the resignation of Rebecca
Mark, another female director, because she was uncomfortable with the paths the
company had taken); see also Feldstein, supra note 145, at 1 (noting that while the
Enron board did have three foreign nationals and was thus internationally diverse,
having elites from other nations can hardly be expected to create the kind of
contentious board atmosphere that would create a culture of scrutiny).
147 In particular the requirement that publicly held companies have boards
with a majority of independent directors, in itself, has a weak empirical basis for
enhancing corporate financial performance. See Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black,
The Non.Correlation Between Board Independence and Long-Term Firm
Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231, 263-65 (2002) (finding that board independence
does not seem to influence corporate financial performance); Sanjai Bhagat &
Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm
Performance, 54 BUS. LAW. 921, 937 (1999) (suggesting that factors other than mere
independence influence financial performance).
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to pursue gender diversity at the board level since 1993.148 If
gender representation is deemed inadequate, the government is
given power to appoint female directors. 149 Norway recently
mandated enhanced diversity for its system of corporate
governance, specifically in response to the corporate corruption
crisis in the United States. It did so in order to harness diversity
in order to quell any outbreak of such a crisis in Norwegian
corporations. 150
Norway now requires that women fill forty
percent of board positions by 2005.151 Sweden seems poised to
152
break the self-replicating cycle of homogenous boards as well.
The United Kingdom has also recently studied the underlying
causes of corporate misconduct, and it has undertaken an effort
to enhance racial, ethnic, and gender diversity at the highest
levels of its corporate governance structure. 153 It concluded that,
left to its own devices, board selection would continue to be
driven by personal contacts of those already in the club, which
would naturally tend to create more homogenous boards; this
would "implicitly discriminate" against those with more diverse
backgrounds.' 54
In the United Kingdom, as elsewhere,
lawmakers and other authorities have addressed recent

148 See Israeli Government Companies Law, §18A (1975) (requiring appropriate
gender representation on boards and empowering the government to make
appointments if such representation does not occur).
149 See id.
150 See Lizette Alvarez, Norway Is Set To Compel Boardrooms To Let More
Women In, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2003, at A3; Charles Goldsmith, Norway Plans To
Require Greater Gender Equality in Boardrooms, WALL ST. J., July 19, 2002, at A9
("Norway's plan has ushered in a broader debate about the need for more boardroom
diversity--of every stripe. The recent corporate scandals in the U.S., say leading
business figures here, illustrate the need to have board members with varied
experience and insight in order to keep close tabs on company executives.").
1,51See Goldsmith, supra note 150, at A9.
152 See Christopher Brown-Humes, Sweden To Engender Top-Level Change in
Its Companies, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2003, at 7.
153 The government of the United Kingdom referred the task of studying the
role of outside directors and making recommendations to increase the effectiveness
of outside directors to Derek Higgs. Derek Higgs, Review of the Role and
Effectiveness of Non-Executive Directors, Jan. 2003, at 17, available at
http://www.dti.gov.uk/cld/non_ exec_review /pdfs/higgsreport.pdf. Higgs specifically
found that boards in the United Kingdom would benefit from enhanced diversity
and encouraged efforts to find board members with more diverse backgrounds. Id.
at 42-45. As a result, the private sector specifically undertook to identify 100
persons of more diverse backgrounds for potential board membership. Id. at 44.
154 Id. at 43.
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corporate turbulence by thinking about the use of diversity as a
1 55
tool to enhance corporate governance.
Compared to the efforts of the United States to harness
diversity, these other advanced nations appear to be far ahead of
our society in appreciating the potential of diversity. The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act can only be considered a disappointment
both in terms of creating a truly independent board culture and
in terms of wasting an excellent opportunity to use our diverse
human resources positively. Indeed, it may well be that in the
end, Sarbanes-Oxley will reduce diversity in the boardroom. I
base this on three facts. First, it would be hard to conclude that
board diversity was an urgent concern of the leaders within
156
corporate America before the corporate corruption crisis.
Second, Sarbanes-Oxley did nothing to alter this deep
ambivalence. 15 7 Third, Sarbanes-Oxley will pose challenges to
corporate leaders just to meet the Act's mandates. 158 They will
be hard pressed to divert resources to locating additional diverse
candidates who fit the requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act. 15 9 Therefore, it appears that Sarbanes-Oxley will probably
extend the racial half-life needed to fully overcome exclusive
traditions within the boardroom. This will, in turn, harm our
business sector as well as stunt our nation's quest for racial
progress.
The failure of the Sarbanes-Oxley reforms to address
diversity will ultimately also hurt the ability of American
business to attract capital in international markets.16 0 Business
has a collective interest in assuring that American corporate
governance standards are perceived as rigorous.1 6 1 There are
See id. at 3, 13, 39-44.
156 See supra text accompanying notes 6-11.
157 See supra text accompanying notes 28-38 (describing the Act without
mentioning the diversity issue).
15s See Johnson-Elie, supra note 118, at D1.
159 See, e.g., Girion, supra note 118, at C1 (quoting a director search expert as
stating that "[s]earch committees are no longer saying, '[they] need a woman' ").
160 The entire Sarbanes-Oxley reform initiative had its genesis in the summer
of 2002 when corporate governance deficiencies raised the cost of capital in America
and contributed to the declining dollar, as eroding investor confidence among
155

international investors caused a flight of capital out of American businesses. See
Ramirez III, supra note 24, at 35.
161 The reform process in the United Kingdom, where diversity has been viewed
as a potential tool to quell corporate corruption, appears to be pulling ahead of the
United States in terms of the perceived integrity of its corporate governance system
in the international press. See Janet McFarland, Across the Board: Governing Rules
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indications that American corporate governance standards may
not be measuring up. 16 2 In fact, there are emerging signs that
the United States capital markets have not regained their
attractiveness to foreign investors, notwithstanding the
enactment and implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley reform
initiative. 16 3 If the thesis of this Article is correct, specifically
that racial thinking is so imbedded in our culture that we cannot
think of diversity as a strength or as a tool, then the prospect of
suffering from flawed corporate governance is particularly
distressing. It means that we are not only blind to the potential
of diversity, but we are so wedded to racial thinking that we will
sacrifice the performance of corporate America and our general
economy on the altar of yesteryear's racial and gender

hierarchy. 164
All of this i3 simply inconsistent with a society that is
striving to overcome its racist hangover and embrace the
potential of its culturally diverse human resources. It is well
established that race has no biological basis and operates only as
a social construct.165
On the other hand, it is also well
established that cultural diversity can lead to gains in small
group interaction, deeper thinking, and more creative problem
solving skills when properly deployed in accordance with an
increasingly clear set of best practices. 166 I have argued in the
past that if our society is indeed serious about unleashing the
potential of our diverse human resources, and incidentally
assisting us in overcoming our racist hangover, then we should
in U.K. Worth a Look, GLOBE & MAIL, Jan. 29, 2003, at B2 (stating that Higgs's

approach "sets the governance bar a major leap higher" and that its voluntary
standards are more rigorous than the mandatory requirements of the SarbanesOxley Act); Andrew Parker & Tony Tassell, Higgs Calls for Greater Boardroom
Diversity, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2003, at 1 (quoting Derek Higgs and questioning the
efficacy of Sarbanes-Oxley reforms).
162 See supra note 161.
163 See Rachel Beck, Where Has Foreign Money Gone?, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 23,
2003, at E2 (quoting an economist as stating that foreign investors are wary of
United States stocks because of concerns regarding corporate corruption).
164 There is currently an initiative pending that seeks to motivate lawmakers to

consider addressing diversity in the boardroom.
165 See Ramirez I, supra note 3, at 40-46 (2001) (canvassing the lack of

scientific validity to notions of race and concluding that "[iun sum, if race is defined
as some arbitrary level of statistically significant genetic divergence between
population groups, such variability is provided by insular local populations instead
of visible morphological features").
166 See id. at 59-60.
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take steps to facilitate the incipient movements in certain sectors
of our society to embrace diversity. 167 We as a society must begin
to look for opportunities to harness diversity. Before we can be
fully successful in this task, however, we need to appreciate
diversity and purge all remnants of the racial mythology of
yesteryear. 168 Unfortunately, the episode of corporate corruption
and reform culminating in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act suggests that
we still think in terms of race and racial problems and not in
terms of the potential for diversity. 169 Our political leaders
seemed to assume that corporate corruption was not a race issue,
and therefore, it appears not to have occurred to them that
diversity in the boardroom could have been a tool in the war on
corporate corruption.
CONCLUSION: LESSONS ON RACE AND DIVERSITY IN AMERICA

Despite lip service and political rhetoric to the contrary, it is
clear that our legal community and political leaders lag behind
the world of business in understanding the potential of diversity
and the archaic nature of race. Instead, the failure to even
discuss enhanced board diversity as a means of enhancing board
monitoring and breaking the grip of groupthink in the
boardroom is emblematic of a governing elite that still believes
in racial mythology. The most compelling proof of the extent of
our collective racial dementia is the failure to follow other
societies that enhance board diversity, specifically in the service
of enhanced board vigilance against the temptations of
corruption.
Even though our scandals have been more
disturbing, our discussion of diversity has been more scanty than
other developed societies.
This is certainly not a vindication of the business
community.
There is no doubt that the most progressive
elements of the business community have embraced diversity,
and this is reflected in the cultural and gender diversity on many
corporate boards. It is not clear why some corporations have
apparently embraced diversity and others seem to resist it.
Overall, it is clear that there seem to be more laggards than
there are diversity models. Much more work needs to be done to

167 See
168 See
169 See

Ramirez II, supra note 13, at 132-33.
supra note 3.
supra text accompanying notes 28-38; see also discussion supra Part I.
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understand the barriers preventing increased diversity in the
boardrooms of corporate America. Once the causes of corporate
resistance are identified, then the law can react in an
appropriate manner.
Specifically, the law can address the
apparent problems in a manner that maximizes the benefits to
the business community while minimizing the disruption of
market forces and corporate functioning.
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